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An interview study of 44 Bangladeshi patients and relatives in eastern London
demonstrated frequent appeals to God and deprecation of personal agency. This paper
offers an interpretation of this apparent ‘fatalism’, which argues for the logical
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Introduction
Islamic societies have been characteristically identiﬁed by Europeans as ‘fatalistic’ – that
is, as having a resigned attitude to human action and misfortune through placing responsi-
bility onto fate (or rather onto God).
The starting point for the current paper was an interview study (Littlewood and Dein
2013a, 2013b) of how one particular Muslim group – Bangladeshis in Britain, both born
in Bangladesh and their British-born children – experiences states characterised by bio-
medicine as mental illness, how they understand and deal with these states, and their satis-
faction or otherwise with the government health services provided. Whilst not strictly
ethnographic, the paper places particular emphasis on respondents’ own statements. The
social and economic conditions of London Bangladeshis are brieﬂy summarised in
Gardner (1995, 2002) and Dein (2009), and the social anthropology of mental illness in
Sylhet by Callan (2005).
There are approximately a third of a million immigrants in Britain from Bangladesh,
95% of them from the north-eastern district of Sylhet, an area with a landholding peas-
antry rather than being comprised of the large estates found elsewhere in East Bengal
(Gardner 1995). The earliest migrants were seamen who settled in London, acting as
brokers in the 1960s for their relatives by obtaining employment vouchers for factory
work. With the cessation of Commonwealth primary migration, entry has since been
restricted to secondary migrants (family members). Relative to other South Asians in
Britain, the families reunited rather later on and are the ‘last’ South Asians to settle (Gardner
1995, 117), with more recent emigrants from Bangladesh going to Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf, but they cannot obtain permanent residence there. Bangladesh is a low-lying coun-
try, a third of which is susceptible to unpredictable ﬂooding each year: and it is rated as
one of the ‘least developed’ nations on the Human Development Index (Colwell et al.
2003, 105). Sylhetis are largely Suﬁ-inﬂuenced Sunni Muslims (but 10% are Hindu) who
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properly cited. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.follow an Islamic path that is depicted by ‘purist’ (clerical, scripturalist) Islam as contam-
inated with Hinduism in its reverence for, if not actual worship of, saintly pirs, a more
thaumaturgical approach to the problems of social and religious life, and with local practi-
ces of oblations, music and dancing. Wealthier Sylhetis are able to practice a more
‘purist’ Islam – female seclusion and ritualised formal religious observance – whilst at
the same time pursuing religious and/or secular education (Gardner 1995).
1 Marriages
and kinship patterns are traditionally through male-descended lineages with a preference
for arranged patrilateral parallel cousin marriage, and continuous generational alternation
between joint (parents, sons, son’s wives and children) and nuclear households. On the
death of a father, the land is equally divided between the sons (with daughters receiving a
half-share), and until recently women were restricted to a household role. In Britain, Syl-
hetis have settled particularly in the East End of London where the men work largely in
‘Indian’ restaurants and garment factories. In the sample for this paper, only two people
cited an occupation that was not restaurant based. Bangladeshis are generally considered
to be the poorest and most socially marginalised minority community in Britain (Gardner
2002; Eade and Garbin 2002); and probably the most self-effacing.
The 25 identiﬁed patients in the sample (16 male, nine female) and the 19 carers
(mostly relatives, three male, 16 female) were interviewed for upwards of an hour each
by one of two Sylheti-speaking Bangladeshi professional community workers, both
women, who had previously completed an MSc with the authors in medical anthropology
and health (see the Acknowledgements section). One woman interviewed was both a reg-
istered patient and also a carer for her brother, and some of the other carers were receiving
counselling or other psychological support. The ages of the patients ranged from 65 years
to 27, of carers 73 to 18. A clear majority of the total sample were born in Bangladesh, 40
out of 44, but two patients and two carers were born in the United Kingdom. All, both
British and Bangladesh-born, had some ﬁrst degree relatives living in Bangladeshi. To try
to tease out any local differences in interpretation of what biomedicine would term physi-
cal and psychological illness, the sample included patients with physical illness (seven
instances) and carers for eight patients with physical problems or somatic symptoms as
well as purely ‘psychological’ illness (29 instances, including two both physical and psy-
chological). Most informants had some schooling with an average of 6.2 years, two had
none (one, ‘Almost nothing – I did go to school for a while’), three had an undergraduate
degree or diploma, one an MSc. In three cases, the educational level was uncertain. All
respondents were Sunni Muslims and at home spoke Sylheti, the language for all but two
of the interviews. About half the women respondents also spoke some English; the others
used their children for translation when outside the home, dealing with hospitals, schools
or the local council ofﬁcials.
A convenience sample, informants were found by random at two mental health day
centres and one social services support centre. They were interviewed privately in Syl-
heti following a loosely structured schedule; all interviews were recorded and then tran-
scribed into English; in three cases the audiotaped interview was succeeded by a lengthy
conversation, which was written up concurrently. No one contacted refused participation
or recording. Respondents were each paid a modest sum of £20. Quotations here are
from the English transcriptions subsequently read by the authors and agreed with the
two interviewers. In this paper, the authors have not attempted to correlate the hospital
diagnosis with the local understandings, so the responses are just a general account of
what might be called ‘distress’ among patients and families: this is justiﬁed by the fre-
quency of change of medical diagnosis and the respondents’ own uncertainty about spe-
ciﬁc causative or aetiology. So, the respondents include a mixture of people that a
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cally, or as quite well.
Examination of the transcripts and discussion with the interviewers revealed a high
proportion of immediate explanations for misfortune involving jiin (spirits) and jadu and
korni (sorcery); frequent sorcery accusations against relatives, generally in-laws but
sometimes against more distant sponsors acting in concert with the in-laws; the ambiguity
of tabij (amulets) which could harm as well as heal, although their use seems to have been
near universal; an ambivalence about Islamic clergy and religious ﬁgures both in Britain
and Bangladesh who were often felt to have their own material interests principally at
heart; and a high level of trust in psychiatric doctors, although informants accepted that
some ‘spiritual illnesses’ would not be affected by biomedicine (Littlewood and Dein
2013a, 2013b). The authors considered from their wider accounts of everyday life and
work that this population, relative to other minority ethnic groups (and perhaps to other
Bangladeshis), was comparatively isolated from mainstream British society (see also
Eade et al 1996). The current paper concentrates on the distal causality and providence
associated with their references to Allah (God).
God
Most respondents when talking of proposed action or anticipated good fortune, would
brieﬂy insert inshallah (God willing): ‘next year I will go to Bangladesh inshallah’; ‘I
hope my children don’t get this sickness: hopefully Allah will keep them well’; ‘I am hop-
ing to get my daughter married soon, Allah willing’. (As for White Britons, such an invo-
cation was only for desired events, although theologically it would make sense for
anticipated adverse events: so, no ‘God willing, I will have no children’.) Allah is the ulti-
mate explanation for any event, even if you yourself strive: ‘My husband gets appoint-
ments to see the psychiatrist every six months, if it gets worse they increase the dose of
the medicine and tell us what to do. The rest is up to Allah.’ Inshallah is less an afﬁrma-
tion of a particular desire or endeavour than a wish that that desire will be within God’s
will: ‘Do not say of anything: “I will do it tomorrow” without adding: “If Allah wills”’
(Qur’an 18: 23, The Cave). And to Him the credit: ‘So one of our informants – by the
grace of God three of my children have graduated. I am grateful to Allah that my children
have achieved so much’ (in English).
And Allah can be supplicated, possibly for a good life: ‘So I prayed, I request Allah to
heal me, to grant me a long life, to enable me to earn money, to keep me well, to forgive
me for my mistakes, and to take me upon the straight path [towards God], that’s what I
used to pray’. Or else for actual healing: ‘I have no physical strength [he had had a
stroke], and I cry out to God for all this suffering; rather than give me all this suffering
...I mean when I am lying in bed, I am begging my wife, “please help me get up, please
help me get up”; but, you know, it’s hard for her too. So I constantly think about this, and
I implore God to help me. A burden: do you think anyone likes carrying a burden? It’s
heavy, and you won’t like carrying it. So, I am like a heavy burden for others in my fam-
ily. I pray to God that God doesn’t make anyone suffer like me.’
Or if God is not solicited to actually heal, then more modestly he may be asked for the
strength to bear a problem which in His wisdom he has chosen to inﬂict. ‘Oh God, what
should I do, I am in such hardship, this person [her husband the patient] is giving me so
much grief.’ ‘I always have faith in Allah: “Whatever you do Allah, please give me the
strength to bear it so I am not a burden to my children”.’ Virtually all the patients and
carers recommended fortitude and faith in God: ‘It says in the Qur’an that if you pray
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GP gives me some medicine which has no effect whatsoever, and I cry out to God from
my heart and pray to be helped and healed; he can choose to take me or heal me. When I
say these words, I ﬁnd comfort and relief, and that then seems to make me much better. I
leave all my trust upon God to take care of me. Prayers seem to bring ease. It’s actually
what can give peace of mind.’
And ‘If I found a good spiritual healer, I could give it a try. But I have not found any. I
say prayers to God; I also send salutations and blessings to the Prophet [with speciﬁc
prayers for this] and then I blow over my chest: I say “la ilaha illallah” [There is no God
but Allah]. And I say that God sent me to this world to go through this.’ And Allah will
often warn you although not by explicit communication (cf. Dein and Littlewood 2007).
‘I think, it was Prophet Muhammad, or maybe a saint [in a dream]! Someone like that,
maybe I am walking on the wrong path [not acting in accordance with religious teaching],
and so I was shown [this] as a reminder to come back on the straight path. Maybe it’s a
message: you have a future to live, you have children to bring up properly, your children
might lose their way on the path, if you don’t try and return on the right path.’ If not actu-
ally a direct communication with Allah then ‘sometimes I sit down to read the Qur’an
[but] then I pray to Allah with the tasbih [prayer beads]. And music gives me some com-
fort, some peace.’
Although all sickness ultimately comes from God as a test, as a punishment or as sim-
ply something mysterious, some problems are seen as more immediately naturalistic
(including from everyday life) or else caused by human sorcery: ‘If I see that it’s a kind
of illness that mullahs treat, then I will suggest to them [her neighbours] to go and consult
a mullah.’ ‘I have been to so many doctors and they tell me it originates from worries and
the rest is perhaps from God’, says a patient’s wife. One woman with a ‘depressed’
(doctor’s diagnosis) husband said: ‘Nothing bad happened because of me. People say that
somebody has done jadu
2 or that a ghost or other spirits have inﬂuenced him. He became
ill all of a sudden you see. I cannot say for sure whether it was caused by worries or was
from God or caused by any jadu.’
‘This pain is giving me a great deal of suffering, everything else does too but this pain
gives the most. What do I do? I sit quietly and call upon God. Sometimes I think that I
should go and see somebody for a tabij
3 or something but then I wonder, well – what
would be the point? My illnesses are nothing to do with ufri’.
4
And ‘Someone from Bangladesh did it [the spirit afﬂiction] to get more [money] from
him ...If this comes from Allah then I will be patient. If it comes from something else,
then Allah will judge this.’ This distinction between spiritual and immediate magical or
physical causation is often made when one sort of treatment is effective or unavailing:
‘Well, if the Satan
5 is going to do something [to cause the symptoms], or whether it
is something due to me [from God, for his actions], there are cures for both of these.
For example, if you went to bed, and had breathing difﬁculties as a result of Satan hav-
ing attacked you and holding you down, then, you can recite prayers from the Qur’an,
and then it will leave you – you will have healing. So, if you want to successfully lib-
erate yourself from that, you will have to be pak.
6 You will have to go to bed in a
pure state, then of course, none of these entities can come near you; that’s according to
our religious perspectives and beliefs, but it’s not something adhered to or believed by
people in this country. How can they, they are not Muslims, they do not believe in the
Qur’an.’
But many remain uncertain, arguing that only Allah knows the immediate cause or the
real spiritual status of the healer. ‘I cannot say for sure whether it is caused by worries or
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is God’s will.’
The pir
7 said something has possessed him [her husband]. You know they say these kinds of
things in Bangladesh. Whether it is true or not, only God knows. I don’t know. His parents
got the tabij and things and visited different pirs’ places, used blessed water and oil things
like that. They did this before and after our marriage. Before giving the tabij the guy sits in a
trance. Only God know and he knows: I don’t know what he does. Whether he is conscious
or unconscious I don’t know. After this he gives the tabij. Then tells you to form the intention
of sacriﬁcing a cow or something for Allah, so you do; He does his healing. You then see
some good [healers] and then some bad, only God knows. For these few years no one is
bothered to help. It doesn’t improve. We have given so much, given money and the cow.
Whenever he went to Bangladesh, they did this.
Sometimes it becomes difﬁcult to adjust proximal against ultimate (divine) causality
in a particular instance, but if a presumed useful treatment does not work, ‘I think it
wasn’t Allah’s will [that the tabij would be effective]; if it was, then just by sitting here
he would get better. If there is no Allah’s will, then nothing would help.’ Even proximal
treatments cannot work without ultimate divine sanction.
Spiritual puriﬁcation and prayer whilst recommended as remedies for illness can also
be used to be effective against unpleasant thoughts:
I recite prayers from the Qur’an and other Islamic books that I have learnt, and I ask God to
help me, and sometimes I do receive help from God when I am frightened. I do receive help.
It used to happen to me about six months ago, I used to feel quite scared, like someone is try-
ing to capture me, kill me, but I came out of it, God helped me. For example, at night I see
that someone is trying to suffocate me to death. Then I will purify myself with wudu [ritual
ablutions], and will recite Ayatul Qursi [the Verses of the Throne, from the Qur’an] seven
times and blow over my chest, and then I see that nothing tries to suffocate me during that
night. It is stated in the Qur’an that efﬁcacy of these prayers depends on one’s state of soul.
Thus, for some, amulets and other spiritual aids can only work if you are spiritually
prepared. ‘If someone’s heart doesn’t want religious help, it’s no use giving them grief’
comments another, ‘Using tabij and things is not useful. I read the Qur’an before I go to
sleep and do my prayers. There is nothing else really.’ And three people were totally
opposed to the clergy’s amulets: ‘I don’t like going to see a mullah and paying them
twenty to thirty pounds. I just cry aloud to Allah.’ Another said:
I don’t need it, there is one God. If you do it yourself, there is no need for the tabij. Using the
tabij is not right. Before, there were the righteous mullahs who said give money to the mos-
ques. The ones who give the tabij now, they want money for it. Yes, that’s how it seems, sis-
ter. I don’t believe in these other forms of treatments. It’s not good to go near these kinds of
treatments. I don’t think it is a good idea. They are bad people [who offer tabij], they make
things worse for people.
These three, among the better off and educated, think an amulet is rather too much
like ‘magic’. The one (British-born) university graduate totally objected to the very idea
of amulets:
basically, if you are a true Muslim and you really believe that Allah can help you, then you
make du’a [prayer] for Allah to help you. If you have something on you, even if it’s the
words of Allah, and you put your trust in that thing ...I can’t. You know I need to learn
from the Qur’an, I need to teach myself things, you know like morals, and how to be a good
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want help it would be by asking Allah, not by putting my trust in things – because that’s like
idol worship. If somebody wears a ‘tabij’ I don’t think they have faith in God. Some people
might get confused. If they put their faith in that thing then that’s completely contradicting
everything that they’re meant to believe in.
But for most, effective healing involves practical measures, medical or spiritual, and
also God’s immediate support, both together. One person with apparently psychotic expe-
riences said:
Actually, you know, I have female fairies
8 that are kind of with me, they are always near by,
and I am always chasing them! But since putting the tabij on, they cannot come near me.
That’s what the measaab [student at a madrasha] has said. You know, it’s like all they do, is
play with me, and I am playing with them. But I can’t catch them and they can’t harm me,
because I have God’s shade upon me, he protects me, otherwise they would have killed me.
And many are conﬁdent that God always answers prayers in some way and in some
form:
Last week a lady came and requested me to give her some blessed water, and I instructed her
as to how she should purify herself, and how she needs to go to bed in a puriﬁed state and
sleep on her right side, and she should present her request to God. I told her that I had no
power to do anything, it was God who has power: she should request God with prayers, and
God shall respond to her prayers; might take days, might take a year or more for God to
respond; but he does respond to prayers. Muslims believe that God does respond to prayers,
we Muslims believe in that – we have that faith. The medicine from the doctors seem to offer
an immediate relief, and the other things: well, they are blessed by God, so it takes time, but
if you have faith in it, it will work. It works slowly...
If you were to have a stomach ache then if you take recited water
9, Allah would pardon you
[and relieve the symptoms]. But I don’t know what he [her husband] has. What are you going
to tell the mullah, what can they give him? Not everyone can understand his illness. Some
people in this country [Britain] don’t like the tabij. We should have the belief that Allah will
help, even if you are mad, you have some faith Allah will help. Medication helps, that’s how
the world is running. The Qur’anic stuff [tabij and pora pani], whether it helps or not, it
would not have any bad effect. Nothing bad will happen, it will stay good. Even if it doesn’t
help, it wouldn’t make it worse. Medication can either make it worse or better.
But some think amulets can be harmful or have almost given up hope: ‘So, I am
always grieving about this, worry about this, that perhaps I have sinned. Will God return
my physical strength? Will he let me live longer? Will he return my strength? If not, then,
will he take me? I think that’s better than others having to endure me.’ Or as a patient’s
relative admitted to praying, ‘Oh God please take this person away, we cannot cope, he is
draining us.’
Ultimately God is responsible and He responds to one’s deeds:
If it is God’s will, maybe the sickness might be passed on [to other family members]. It’s a
short life. If you do good things, it’s good. If you do bad things, sometimes you get a punish-
ment here, and some in the hereafter. And for worries, you say to yourself that all that is hap-
pening to me is happening due to God’s will, so what’s the point in worrying about these
things? For example, I have a mother and she died. I cried but I consoled myself that she has
been taken by God to him, and that belief was reassuring and it helped me in my grieving.
When my daughter-in-law passed away, I was feeling so upset and anxious, and then I said
to myself: ‘well we will all have to die one day.’ And that brought me a sense of relief. These
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level of our sustenance, and the time of our death: these are matters decided by God.
And: ‘I believe in Allah and he has given me this test, and if I do take it easy [stop
worrying] I’ll be the gainer. So I have to ask Him for forgiveness if I did anything wrong
in the past. Why is this happening? Maybe we did wrong that Allah is not happy with.
I’m getting punishment so I need to change: to do more reading and praying, try to pray
ﬁve times a day at exactly the right time.’ ‘I always think about these things and cry to
God I don’t know what sins I have committed.’ A mother with a psychotic son: ‘I took
him back to Bangladesh thinking that he might get some peace. But it didn’t work. Here
[in London], getting medication and things, gradually Allah has pardoned [relieved]
him.’ And if the illness is clearly willed by God, that can to an extent displace individual
agency and thus perhaps stigma: ‘His father was such an intelligent and well-known per-
son: everybody understood this happened because of Allah’s will, so why should our rep-
utation or our name suffer?’
‘Islamic fatalism’
There are thus limits to human agency in Islam: and it seems that God is particularly
appealed to in the instances of the more chronic, the more serious and the less intelligible.
Whatever happens, it is God’s will, although He may be responding to one’s past actions
or else be simply inscrutable. And there is a long European tradition of ascribing to
Muslims fatalism, of not merely accepting God’s ultimate providence but of giving up
too soon, of not pursuing actions such as healing for long enough (by European measures)
but passing the call for action onto God, a critique which Edward Said (1978) has argued
supported colonialism. A good example is provided by the Arabist and traveller Charles
Doughty in the 1880s when he attempted to offer some sick Arab children medicine but
was told their fate was in the hands of God. He reported: ‘If I said, “Are not the medicines
the gift of Ullah?” They answered, “We are trusting in Ullah”...This is the supine nature
of Arabs, that negligent of themselves and expectations of heaven to do all for them,
which they take for a pious acquiescence in the true faith: this fond humour passed into
their religion we have named the fatalism of the Mohammedians’ (Doughty 1888, 155).
All Bedouin are ‘improvident’ says the modern English adventurer Wilfred Thesiger
(2007, 113). In a sense then this fatalism is taken as particularly Arab (and indeed pre-
Islamic): ‘this fond humour passed into their religion’ [our emphasis]. T.E. Lawrence
blamed the desert for ‘this climatic Arab God’: ‘It was easily felt as an inﬂuence, and
those who went into the desert long enough to forget its open spaces and its emptiness were
inevitably thrust upon God as the only refuge and rhythm of being’(Lawrence 1926, 29).
Something akin to this was found among the pre-Islamic Arabs as dahr, a notion of
Fate, which appears very similar to that of classical Greece (Bowering 1997). Dahr was
modiﬁed by Islam in that a personiﬁed deity now controlled fate. What Allah has deter-
mined happens (Bowering 1997: 58); when you are still in the womb an angel writes
down your daily life, happiness and illness, hour of death. ‘Unavoidable as fate and irre-
versible as time, each instant happens solely through God’s very own action’ (Bowering
1997: 58). And each moment of time is God’s creation. The Muslim historian Ibn
Khald^ un (2005) in the fourteenth century CE presents the desert as the source of group
solidarity, spirituality and creativity, successive movements that establish urban dynasties
which eventually become decadent and decay. The frugal inhabitants of the desert are
found to be more religious and more ready for divine worship (Ibn Khald^ un 2005: 67).
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kles his text with comments such as ‘God gives success where he wills’, ‘This is how
God proceeds’, ‘According to the way He has planned’, particularly when talking of
major dynastic and cultural changes, whereas the smaller changes in history are under-
stood through individual human psychology and self-determination: ‘The ﬁnal outcome
is up to God’ (Ibn Khald^ un 2005: 24). (Compare structural functionalism and agency in
social science.) This seems similar to the earlier view of Abu’l-Hudhail (ninth century
CE) that man can be said to be the agent only of acts he can contemplate; the rest is up to
God (cf. Fakhry 2004, 49–50).
Europeans can be quite scathing about such apparent fatalism which they have charac-
terised as ‘defeatism’: ‘As far as the Arab personality is concerned, there can be no doubt
that the same belief in predestination or fate ...exerts considerable formative inﬂuence.
It engenders an attitude of passivity and of disinclination to undertake efforts to change
or improve things. It especially discourages long term efforts which require advance plan-
ning, because any such activity might come dangerously close to rebelling against Allah,
and his will as manifested in the existing order of things’ (Patai 1983, 163). So, to quote
one Western scholar, as their new religion passed beyond the Arabs to become a wider
religious community, ‘It has become a commonplace that Islam is a fatalistic religion
which teaches that everything is determined in advance and that man is unable to do any-
thing about it’ (Ringgren 1967, 52).
In considering the validity of this idea, we ﬁrst need to clarify the distinction between
this attribution of defeatist fatalism (e.g. Senior et al. 1999) and the doctrine of predesti-
nation – what is written on ones forehead – (qada at qadar, lit. judge of judges) which is
certainly Qur’anic: ‘For if Allah should touch you with adversity, there is no remove of it
except Him; and if He intends for your good, then there is no repeller of His bounty’ (20:
107–109). ‘The fate of each man we have bound about his neck’ (17: 15); ‘Nothing will
befall us except what Allah has ordained’ (9: 51). There is some conﬂict between surren-
dering to God’s will and the search for treatment at times of illness. The Prophet was sup-
posedly asked ‘Do our supplication, medication and methods of prevention prevent
anything that God has willed?’ He replied ‘These are also part of God’s will.’ Although
illness occurs according to God’s will, every Muslim is commanded to protect himself
against it, deploying preventive methods (which also work by God’s will). The Prophet
approved the principle of medical treatment and encouraged his followers to seek it. In a
hadith, he is quoted as saying: ‘Make use of medical treatment, for Allah has not made a
disease without appointing a remedy for it, with the exception of one disease [whose]
name was old age’ (Sunan Abi Dawood, 28: 3846). And in another: ‘There is no disease
that Allah has created, except that He also has created its treatment’ (Sahih al-Bukhari,
7:71:582).
Reconciling predestination (by an omniscient, omnipotent but inscrutable God) with
free will and human action was a similar problem for Christianity (Romans 8: 28–30),
and came to the doctrinal fore with St. Augustine, and later in Calvinism, which solved it
by arguing that although you could never be sure of being ultimately saved, you had to
act as if you were, and if God favoured you materially in this life then that was a promis-
ing sign. Unlike Christianity, Islam has no doctrine of original sin (Conrad 1999); without
going too deep into the theology of Islamic predestination and free will,
10 simply God has
inscrutably decided who is to be ultimately saved or damned, and He also decides whom
to punish in this life. (‘If Allah should touch you with adversity, then there is no remover
of it except Him’: Qur’an 20: 104). Yet at the same time as one is free to act, you are
obviously in with a better practical chance if you choose to follow Islam however matters
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believed, entirely’: 20: 99). And adversity or punishment in this life may be not just pun-
ishment, but may lead to an accelerated progression to paradise and, as in Christianity, a
test of faith: mundane illness may be because He has something greater in store (Conrad
1999). Prayers are future directed, not to change the past (but forgiveness may be sought
for past sins). And submission to God seems a more prominent motif in Islamic than
Christian or Judaic theology.
11
In practice, it is a good idea to separate out such ‘theological fatalism’ from ‘empirical
fatalism’ (Acevedo 2008) which has been said to be more common in peasant societies
(Wolf 1966).
12 Does such normative doctrine actually affect individual understanding
and action in everyday life? In a questionnaire study of attitudes, Acevedo (2008) ﬁnds
that theological fatalism (e.g. ‘No matter which I want to do or be, there is a much more
superior power that fully determines the course of my life’) is certainly greater among
Muslims than Christians in two societies where the religions coexist, Lebanon and Indo-
nesia, but empirical fatalism (‘How strongly do you feel that you are in control of what
you would like to do in your life?’) is no greater among Muslims than Christians in both
these countries: indeed in Indonesia, Christians are more empirically fatalistic than Mus-
lims. Acevedo ﬁnds that empirical fatalism is more tied to social position than to religious
membership, but there is some statistical association between the two types of fatalism.
Anthropologists would of course have numerous objections to this sort of study
13 but we
think it not without interest.
And is the frequent solicitation of Allah (inshallah) then, though obviously theologi-
cally derived, no more than a customary polite self-abnegation or basically ‘meaningless’
polite phrase?
14 Maybe, but the longer and more poignant requests and thanks to Allah in
these interview excerpts do suggest something more than vapid convention. And yet at
the same time it is ambiguous whether these always represented direct requests to God
for immediate action rather than pious hopes or sturdy acquiescence.
To make some sense of this, it can be compared to something apparently rather differ-
ent: deﬂecting accusations of possessing evil eye. Thirty years ago, the ﬁrst author (RL)
took his six-month old daughter with him for his ﬁrst ﬁeldwork in Trinidad. They were
the only whites along the northern coast, and his blonde blue-eyed daughter was an object
of curiosity for the local villagers and then for the religious cult they stayed with.
Children scarcely bigger than her would attempt to pick her up and carry her around the
wooden huts as a sort of trophy. And elderly matrons would come up to her and say: ‘Oh,
isn’t she an ugly little thing’, and cheerfully pinch her ear until she cried. Now in spite of
the wonderful Trinidad tradition of picong or barbed satire, RL took this as far from mali-
cious. (He did receive plenty of actual semi-malicious picong himself.) And he saw simi-
lar actions directed towards others in the village: nobody would say ‘What magniﬁcent
mangoes your tree has!’ or ‘I do admire your new boat’ – or ‘your garden’, or ‘wife’, or
‘child’. Such a statement would have led to suspicions of envy and, if something adverse
happened, to assumptions (seldom accusations) of evil eye (maljo).
15 One never went out
of one’s way to praise anything, but one might grudgingly acknowledge some merits or
even better say the obvious inverse. ‘An ugly little thing’ meant ‘a pretty little thing’, and
making her cry was a guarantee that nothing worse would befall her. And more recent
ﬁeldwork in Albania and the Lebanon has yielded a remarkably similar pattern of evil
eye avoidance as in the West Indies (Littlewood 2007).
16 (There are some minor differen-
ces: in Albania, for instance, evil eye is only operative before midday.) Anything growing
or being built is liable to evil eye: in Trinidad, RL’s host family’s chicken enclosure
was protected by a blue bottle (a sort of general all-purpose banishment of evil and
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suspended dolls or images with large eyes to deﬂect the evil eye. Similar blue eyes as apo-
tropaic pendants or brooches may be seen in Greek or Turkish grocer’s shops in London.
The evil eye is unconscious in all these (and other) countries and as such is perhaps a
way of refusing conscious responsibility for others’ misfortune. To quote Ibn Khald^ un
(2005, 396): ‘A person who kills by means of sorcery or a miraculous act must be killed,
but a person who kills with the eye must not be killed.’ You don’t wish to do it or know
that you are doing it but certain people do have a reputation for it. So one has to take
precautions to make sure you are not doing it or to make sure that nobody suspects you.
On the rare occasion of having done it, the correct course is to say you had not intended
it and to apologise (not an easy thing if the animal or child has died). Compare this
with Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) rather similar interpretation of Zande witchcraft.
17 The
evidence of evil eye is that the growing organism or building is withered (blighted in
Trinidad English), and will fade away and die. The ﬁner points of curing blight from
evil eye by secret Latin prayers in both countries are beyond detailed consideration
here, except to note that in Trinidad (and perhaps once in Albania) evil eye can almost –
almost – be motivated. Bad talking (gossip) and long eye (envy) in Trinidad similarly
shade into frank dirty ways (the euphemism for sorcery), with the underlying motive
being the same: a desire to gain or destroy at the expense of others, to covet their wealth,
or plant, or child, or youth, or beauty, such that you assimilate it to yourself and leave
the other diminished and bereft. And in the borderlands between the motivated and the
unconscious, RL found the same thing with zombiﬁcation accusations in Haiti, as
Ardener has in Cameroon, and express envy is of course the standard rationale behind
sorcery (Douglas 1970).
Fatalism is the ﬂip side to egalitarianism and communal solidarity. The authors would
suggest, quite simply, that in small-scale face-to-face communities, such as rural Trinidad
or Bangladesh (and still among the socially constricted Bangladeshi communities in Lon-
don), it is just not appropriate to attribute too much to personal agency or even to be
aware of one’s own agency: the overtly ambitious or too conﬁdent person is an object of
suspicion and fear. ‘The over-eager [Muslim] peasant moves ahead of the collective
rhythms which assign each act its particular moment in the space of the day, the year or
human life; his race with time threatens to drag the whole group into the escalation of dia-
bolic ambition ...And thus to turn circular time into linear time, simple reproduction into
indeﬁnite accumulation’ (Bourdieu 1977, 162). In what L  evi-Strauss (1962) called ‘cold
societies’, with relatively little social change or mobility such as, in our case, archaic Ara-
bia, late medieval Europe, or post-colonial village Bengal and Trinidad, local social rela-
tions follow a ‘zero sum’ mentality: if you are getting wealthy it is at my expense, your
success is my failure.
18 As Ibn Khald^ un (2005, 297) puts it, ‘Whatever is obtained by one
is denied to the other, unless he gives something in exchange.’ If you are so sure of your
success, how come? What unhallowed things have you got working for you? Have you
forgotten your obligations to your fellows so soon? Do you really think you can do it on
your own, you who think yourself so self-sufﬁcient? And in situations of potential
advancement (Islamic expansion, early modern Europe, contemporary modernity,
19 one
has to be careful to displace any assumptions of self-advancement or well-being outside
the customary limits of community obligations to avoid arousing jealous accusations and
resentment, and thus losing social and cultural support.
Too facile optimism can be suspect and it is better to attribute major successes and
misfortunes to some inscrutable deity or providence. Effortless agency and positive think-
ing, self-sufﬁciency and conﬁdent health, all can be dangerous. In the words of Samuel
Anthropology & Medicine 273Beckett, ‘Do not despair, one of the thieves was saved; do not presume, one of the thieves
was damned.’
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Notes
1. As Gellner (1992) has noted, purist ‘High’ Islam (literate, rule-abiding, scriptualist, puritani-
cal, clerical, unitarian) has, in the modern world with urbanisation and modern information
technologies, inﬁltrated and is replacing ‘Low’ Islam (peasant, popular, syncretic, magical,
ecstatic). See Husain’s (2007) autobiographical account for Bangladeshis in England.
2. jahu and korni: both (morally neutral) magic and particularly malevolent sorcery (sometimes
called ‘black magic’ by Bangladeshis in England).
3. Amulet containing Qur’anic verses or other mantra used for sorcery as well as (more com-
monly) healing.
4. ‘Ufri [evil airs] is when you walk underneath a tree maybe and something catches you like say
bad air, you can get bad air from the graveyard too. [Some informants said it could not happen
in England, others that it did.] But korni – sorcery – is when someone does something to you.
Azim’s wife Jasmin thought it was korni because Azim’s cousin had wanted him to marry
her. But Azim’s dad didn’t want it, and wanted to go up market and get Azim married to Jas-
min. Azim was good-looking at the time, you could sell him because of that. Jasmin’s relatives
were inﬂuential, her uncle was a chairman [of a village council], her family were from a
higher class than Azim. Azim’s family are lower caste.’ Sorcery can happen both in England
and (particularly) Bangladesh, or pass from Bangladesh to England.
5. Shaytaan (Satan): either the Devil himself, a malevolent non-Muslim jiini or simply ‘the
rebellious part of your personality’ [as one informant put it].
6. Spiritually puriﬁed by ritual ablutions and prayer.
7. Pir: ‘living saint’, a revered religious ﬁgure in Bangladesh usually with the power to offer
spiritual counselling and healing. Along a spectrum between purist (‘Saudi’) Islam and the
more ecstatic and thaumaturgical, and sometimes seen locally as ‘mad’ (Wilce 2000).
8. Probably an English loan word for jiin.
9. pora pani: water over which Qur’anic verses have been recited.
10. Such as the signiﬁcant ʽAbbasid dispute between the Muʽtazilites and the Ashʽarites as to
whether (i) mundane causality was illusory, consequent on God creating and sustaining matter
only for a successive single moment (Fakhry 2004, 54–56), and (ii) whether the Qur’an itself
was created or uncreated (and thus as to whether God’s unity was compromised). As opposed
to the Muʽtazites, the Ashʽarites argued that whilst God certainly had foreknowledge of human
action this could be accommodated to God’s omniscience as He allows people to ‘acquire’
actions that were created by Him at the moment of action thus preserving human agency
(Ruthuen 1997, 58–59, Campanini 2008, 6–9, 51–153, Fakhry 2004, 41–54). Some Muslim
sects such as the Khardarites continued to deny predestination until quite late in the history of
Islam (see Ibn Battuta 2009, 86). And the Shites were generally less enthusiastic (Fakhry
2004). Ibn Sına (Avicenna) rejected the notion of chance or natural determinism by stating
that based upon the Qur’an, ‘God’s providence means not only that He is the ultimate cause
of everything but also responsible for the concatenation of causes’ (Belo 2007: 125). He goes
as far as to say that man’s attempt to inﬂuence God’s will through praying is redundant since
even man’s action of praying has been envisaged by God and embedded into the greater deter-
mination (Belo 2007, 129). Ibn Khaldun (2005, 11) holds that communities when growing in
population and wealth become weak and lethargic, and consequently are an easy prey for
other less developed communities. A nation collapses as it attains a certain level, in favour of
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ment. This natural law, used to explain the social and political fragility of the Maghreb in the
fourteenth century CE, is based upon the assumption that this historic determination is
unchangeable as it is God’s will (Mojuetan 1981, 100). Nor, as contemporary anthropology, is
this paper directly concerned with the recent philosophical debates (Holton 2010, Mele 2010)
following Benjamin Libet’s famous experiments as to whether humans actually do have
agency – active free will – but rather with the social meaning of what people think, of whether
they experience themselves as possessing agency, and under what limits they feel they initiate
actions: in other words, the indigenous psychology of agency, agency as a mode of thought.
This has recently become of interest in medical social science in arguing whether ‘biological
predestination’ (e.g. in genetic screening) has any inﬂuence on whether people perceive an ill-
ness as determined and thus as uncontrollable (Senior, Marteau, and Peters 1999). And thus,
whether ultimate biological or spiritual causation leads to greater ‘fatalism’ about the illness
(and thence to less stigmatisation: Littlewood, Jadhav, and Ryder 2007).
11. Islam means surrender of the self (to God). Jews are famous for arguing with God: almost
unthinkable in Islam.
12. The authors could of course argue religious fatalism elsewhere in small-scale communities
(Young et al. 2011).
13. That is, the relevance of a questionnaire approach in these two countries; the local meaning of
the questionnaire’s wording; the political and social context of each group in the particular
country; literacy; context of the interview; origin and deportment of the interviewer, and so
on.
14. RL’s father, a classically educated Quaker agnostic, would occasionally add onto such parting
expressions as ‘See you then next week’ a brief ‘DV’ (deo volente, God willing) with perhaps
an air of concern for your wellbeing or perhaps as a simple jeu d’esprit. The authors are not
convinced he was engaging in divine solicitation, maybe wryly referring to the unpredictabil-
ity of human plans (‘careful how you go’) and directed to some generalised sense of an unpre-
dictable fate but not to a personalised divinity.
15. maljo: from Spanish mal ojo, evil eye (Littlewood 2007).
16. And as nozor in Bangladesh itself [Callan 2005, Gardner 1997], although none of the inform-
ants in the current study mentioned it. It is countered with a black dot painted on the child’s
forehead.
17. The authors would venture that evil eye passed with the Spaniards from the Mediterranean to
the Spanish Main and the Caribbean, then absorbing similar African ideas of witchcraft from
among the slaves.
18. Compare ‘hot’ societies: change and mobility, the lauding of the entrepreneur and ‘trickle
down’ economics, Adam Smith’s invisible hand, with individual greed generating general
prosperity.
19. ‘Zero sum’ community solidarity is obviously not restricted to the small scale ‘tribal’ societies
to which L  evi-Strauss was referring (Geschiere 1997, Wolfe 1966). And with greater opportu-
nities for advancement in England, Bangladeshis there may experience a (temporary) height-
ened sense of betrayal, not least in their relations with Sylhet (Gardner 1995). (Although, of
course, relative to White Britons, Bangladeshis have limited opportunities for economic
development and self-assertion [Gardner 2002].) In contemporary post-colonial Trinidad, this
presumed egalitarianism is demonstrated by a sentiment of ‘crab antics’ (once caught, a crab
can safely be left in an open barrel with a load of other crabs, for any crab trying to climb out
will be pulled down by the others; a single crab left to itself will easily get out), articulated by
a whole local repertoire of picong: ‘The higher a monkey climb the more he expose himself’
(Littlewood 1993). Residues of the same egalitarian impulse may be found in modern Britain,
particularly among the ‘old’ working class who modestly deprecate our relative wealth or
achievements – as if boasting of them will bring down the wrath of Fate or Deity upon us (cf.
tempting fate; hubris and nemesis; ﬁngers crossed; gambling wins are not ‘real money’; ‘let
me die then but please not yet’, and so on). As if one cannot quite believe in one’s success and
that it will be swept away: perhaps the origins of this lie in humanity’s evolutionary past in
resenting the free rider. And as the authors’ colleague Yemi Oloyede has pointed out, in West
Africa, rationalisations of the denial of relative good health or wealth has the immediate prac-
tical advantage of avoiding unwelcome requests for loans, gifts and assistance. A poor Ban-
gladeshi will say the rich were given wealth by Allah as a test of their generosity (Gardner
Anthropology & Medicine 2751995, 146). For Kabyle: ‘Lord, give to me that I may give’ (Bourdieu 1977, 239). Pierre
Bourdieu 1977, 224) notes that in contemporary (1950s) Algeria, Kabyle avoid measuring
anything for even that is too close to limiting, breaking, cutting your life: a preference for
ambiguity means the downplaying of agency. ‘Nothing is more foreign than the attempt to
secure a hold over the future, and nothing is more strange to it than the idea of an immense
and open future as a broad ﬁeld of innumerable possibilities which man is able to explore and
dominate’ (Bourdieu 1977, 56).
References
Acevedo, G. A. 2008. “Islamic Fatalism and the Clash of Civilisations: An Appraisal of a Conten-
tious and Dubious Theory.” Social Forces 86 (4): 1711–1752.
Belo, C. 2007. Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes. Boston: Brill.
Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
B€ owering, G. 1997. “The concept of time in Islam. Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society 141: 55–66.
Callan, A. 2005. “Mental Illness, Medical Pluralism and Islamism in Sylhet, Bangladesh.” PhD
thesis, University College London.
Callan, A. 2007. ““What Else can we Bengalis do?”: Sorcery, Overseas Migration and the New
Inequalities in Sylhet, Bangladesh.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 13 (2): 331–
343.
Campanini, M. 2008. An Introduction to Islamic Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
Colwell, R., A. Huq, M. Islam, K. Aziz, M. Yumas, W. Khan, A. Mahmud. et al. 2003. “Reduction
of Cholera in Bangladeshi Villages by Simple Filtration.” PNAS 100 (3): 1051–1055.
Comaroff, J., and J. L. Comaroff. 2003. “Alien-nation: Zombies, Immigrants and Millennial
Capitalism.” South Atlantic Quarterly 101 (4): 779–805.
Conrad, L. I. 1999. “Medicine and Martyrdom: Some Discussions of Suffering and Divine Justice in
Early Islamic Society.” In Religion, Health and Suffering, edited by J. R. Hinnells, and R.
Porter, London: Kegan Paul International.
Dein, S. 2009. “The Jinn, Black Magic and Evil Eye amongst East London Bangladeshis.” In The
Devil’s Children, edited by J. L. Fontaine, Farnham: Ashgate.
Dein, S., and R. Littlewood. 2007. “The Voice of God. Anthropology and Medicine 14 (2): 213–
228.
Doughty. C. 1888. Travels in Arabia Deserta. 2010 ed. New York: Cosimo.
Douglas, M., ed. 1970. Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations. London: Tavistock.
Eade, J., C. Peach, and T. Vamplew. 1996. “Bangladeshis in Britain: the Encapsulated
Community.” In Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, Vol. 2, edited by C. Peach, London: HMSO.
Eade, J., and D. Garbin. 2002. “Changing Narratives of Violence, Struggle and Resistance: Bangla-
deshis and the Competition for Resources in the Global City.” Oxford Development Studies
30 (2): 137–149.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1937. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Fakhry, M. 2004. A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Gardner, K. 1995. Global Migrants, Local Lives: Travels and Transformation in Rural Bangladesh.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gardner, K. 1997. Songs at the River’s Edge: Stories from a Bangladeshi Village. London: Pluto.
Gardner, K. 2002. Narrative, Age and Migration: Life Histories and the Life Course amongst
Bengali Elders in London. Oxford: Berg.
Gellner, E. 1992. Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. London: Routledge.
Geschiere, P. 1997. The Modernity of Witchcraft. Charlottesville: Virginia University Press.
Holton, R. 2010. Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford: University Press.
Husain, E. 2007. The Islamist. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Ibn Battuta 2009. The Travels of Ibn Battuta. New York: Cosimo.
Ibn Khald^ un 2005. The Muqaddimah. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lawrence, T. E. 1926. The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. 2006 ed. Stroud: Nonsuch.
L  evi-Strauss, C. 1962. La Pens  ee Sauvage. Paris: Plon.
Littlewood, R. 1993 Pathology and Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
276 R. Littlewood and S. DeinLittlewood, R. 2007. “Limits to Agency in Psychopathology: a Comparison of Trinidad and
Albania.” Anthropology and Medicine 14 (1): 95–114.
Littlewood, R., S. Jadhav, and A. G. Ryder 2007. “A Cross-cultural Study of the Stigmatisation of
Severe Psychiatric Illness: Historical Review, Methodological Considerations and Develop-
ment of the Questionnaire.” Transcultural Psychiatry 44 (2): 171–202.
Littlewood, R., and S. Dein. 2013a. (in press) The Doctors’ Medicine and the Ambiguity Of Amu-
lets: Life and Suffering among Bangladeshi Psychiatric Patients and their Families in London -
An Interview Study – 1.
Littlewood, R., and S. Dein. 2013b. (in preparation) Carers and Families: Life and Suffering among
Bangladeshi Psychiatric Patients and their Families in London – An Interview Study – 3.
Mele, A. R. 2010. Reﬂective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford: University Press.
Mojuetan, B. A. 1981. “Ibn Khaldun and his Cycle of Fatalism.” Studia Islamica 53: 93–108.
Patai, R. 1983. The Arab Mind. Rev. edit. New York: Scribner’s.
Ringgren, H. 1967. “Islamic Fatalism.” In Ringgen (ed.) Fatalistic Beliefs in Religion, Folklore and
Literature. Abo: Almquist and Wiksell.
Ruthven, M. 1997. Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Said, E. 1978. Orientalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Senior, V., T. M. Marteau, and T. J. Peters. 1999. “Will Genetic Testing for Predisposition for Dis-
ease Result in Fatalism? A Qualitative Study of Parents’ Responses to Neonatal Screening for
Familial Hyper-Cholesterolaemoia.” Social Science and Medicine 45: 1857–1860.
Thesiger, W. 2007. Arabian Sands. London: Penguin.
Wilce, J. M. 1998. Eloquence in Trouble: The Poetics and Politics of Complaint in Rural Bangla-
desh. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilce, J. M. 2000. “The Poetics of ‘Madness’: Shifting Codes and Styles in Linguistic Construction
of Identity in Matlab, Bangladesh.” Cultural Anthropology 15 (1): 3–34.
Wolfe, E. R. 1966. Peasants. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Young, M. J., M. W. Morris, S. Burrus, L. Krishnar, and M. P. Pegmi. 2011. “Deity and Destiny:
Patterns of Fatalistic Thinking in Christian and Hindu Cultures.” Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology 42 (6): 1030–1053.
Anthropology & Medicine 277